Monday, August 18, 2008

SADC Summit Fails to Bring Parties to Agreement, but who feels the pressure?

If South African President Thabo Mbeki had things work his way, he would have been able to conclude this past weekend's SADC summit in South Africa with the announcement of a successful conclusion of the powersharing talks between ZANU-PF, the MDC-T (Tsvangarai), and teh MDC-M (Mutambara). Tsvangarai appears to have survived the intense pressure of the Angolans and Tanzanians (along with South Africa) to sign on to the agreement, and reports suggest that Tsvangarai called Mugabe's bluff with his last suggestion that Mugabe accept the position of Prime Minister with a limited portfolio offered to him. Not surprisingly, Mugabe would not accept such a limit.

Two good post-summit articles are worth considering. The first, by Kenyan reporter Kitsepile Nyathi, based in Harare and writing for Kenya's The Nation newspaper, provides useful insights into the pressures on Mugabe and his ZANU-PF from the Joint Operations Command (JOC), the group of military leaders reported to be responsible for orchestrating the political violence against the MDC during the presidential elections. Nyathi writes:

"His [Mugabe's] image of a man with sole and absolute power was brought into question. South African President Thabo Mbeki spent four days holed in a Harare hotel after Zanu PF and MDC negotiators produced a draft agreement that many believed was a panacea to the impasse that has kept Zimbabwe without a government for five months.

He went back home empty handed after Mr Tsvangirai walked out of the talks protesting that he no longer "understood the language" Mr Mugabe was talking at the negotiating table.

Reports have since emerged that defence forces commander, General Constantine Chiwenga told Mr Mugabe that the army was not prepared to honour any arrangement that leaves Mr Tsvangirai as the dominant figure in government.

Gen Chiwenga is the leader of the Joint Operations Command (JOC), which is made up heads of the army, police, prisons and intelligence that has effectively usurped power from Mr Mugabe since Mr Tsvangirai defeated him in the presidential election held on March 29.

Another Threat

Then another threat came from former liberation war fighters who are said to have ordered the 84 year-old president not to accept any power sharing deal with the opposition, warning that he risked dire consequences including the invasion of commercial farms.

The warnings were separately delivered to Mr Mugabe on Monday, while Zimbabweans expected that the three leaders including Professor Arthur Mutambara of the small faction of the MDC were close to signing the anxiously awaited power-sharing deal.

"The outcome of the talks hinges on the army generals and Mugabe is only there as a figure head," said a researcher at the Department of War and Strategic Studies at the University of Zimbabwe who could not be named for professional reasons.

"The military remains deeply suspicious of Tsvangirai and some commanders feel that they have sacrificed a lot for Mugabe to lose out their positions just like that."

He said Zimbabwe's political transition from the Lancaster House talks that brought the country's independence in 1980 to an accord that ended a civil war in 1987 had always been negotiated by soldiers who must be involved if the current talks were to succeed."


Another helpful article comes from AFP and appears from the sources cited to have been composed in South Africa. The article also points to the JOC as the main force dictating an all or nothing strategy for Mugabe in the talks:

"I think the question to ask from where I'm sitting is whether it is Mugabe's decision," said Aubrey Matshiqi of the Centre for Political Studies in South Africa. An obstacle to a settlement to end the crisis that intensified after Mugabe's widely condemned re-election in June may be the Joint Operations Command, he said. "It would be very difficult for the JOC for instance to give up ministerial posts if this includes giving up the security portfolios." Tsvangirai in June claimed that Zimbabwe was being run by a "military junta", and he boycotted the June run-off vote, citing rising violence against his supporters that had left dozens dead and thousands injured.

The opposition leader has held out so far against accepting a deal that he sees as not granting him real power."


According to analysts cited in the article, there is still a notion that Mugabe and his generals will have to concede some power in order to access Western economic aid:

Despite the differences between the bitter rivals, some analysts say some type of deal will eventually come out of the discussions. Eldred Masungure, a lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe, told AFP that "a deal is inevitable". "There will be an immense pressure on both parties to reach a deal," he said. "Failure is not an option as all other exits are blocked."

But where a deal will leave the opposition is unclear, and some analysts argue Tsvangirai will never accept an agreement that does not give him a workable share of power. "Robert Mugabe might be willing to give some power to Morgan Tsvangirai, but that power will only translate to 25 percent of real power and that would not include him giving Morgan control of the army, police and the intelligence," said Takavira Zhou, a political analyst in Zimbabwe.

In the meantime, Zimbabwe's economic meltdown continues. Once seen as a regional breadbasket, the country now has the world's highest inflation rate, officially put at 2.2 million percent, and major food shortages.

Some argue Mugabe's party may be willing to accept a deal if only to free up international aid. "Zanu-PF seems to have a problem in giving real power to the MDC, but eventually they will have to," said Takura Zhangazha, director of the Media Institute of Southern Africa. World Bank and IMF support will be needed "to get the economy back on track", Zhangazha said."


This seems logical and has been a constant way of interpreting Mugabe's willingness to deal--beyond the need to help Mbeki and SADC placate international demands for some sort of negotiated settlement. It would be naive to count out Mugabe's search for alternatives to dealing with the IMF World Bank. While these attempts have recently faltered, there is still an international competition between mining interests that is likely very involved in the behind the scenes backroom negotiations. This is were the money is made and the power is brokered. In the Rhodesian settlement talks of the 1970s, mining and construction maverick Tiny Rowland was always deeply involved with African nationalists and the international mining community. Today the Tiny Rowlands are from the UK, North America, South Africa, Russia, India, and China's powerful platinum mining interests. As long as the talks can continue--which all sides have reiterated will happen--the mining interests will be hard at work making promises and accepting handshake deals with all parties at the table. Why then, would any party be in a hurry to reach an agreement? Meanwhile, Tsvangarai has the almost impossible task of not betraying the goals of the MDC over the past 8 years. Nyati's report shows just how unpopular are suggestions that Arthur Mutambara has agreed to work with ZANU-PF and form a government with their 10 MPs (ZANU has 99 and MDC-T has 100) based on the March 29th elections. According to Nyati,

"Seven of the faction's 10 MPs [MDC-M] threatened to resign from the party rather than work with Zanu PF."

Where then will the pressure come? Is the international community now so preoccupied with Georgia that it has moved on from its 'horror' over the political violence in Zimbabwe? Has Mbeki been handed over exclusive rights to work this problem out? There is passing reference to pressure on Tsvangarai and Mbeki to reach an agreement. Where is the pressure coming from on South Africa? The US State Department is unlikely to take up the issue with much gusto, after all, most of the key political appointees working on Africa are now working on their CVs and looking for new work starting in January. Once again, time and South Africa's and SADC's inability to stand up on principle and defend Zimbabweans appears to be giving Mugabe and his generals little need to rush. In addition, after the Olympic Flame goes out in Beijing, China will be "more free" to act in Zimbabwe...

To recap events of the past 6 weeks since Mugabe's self-coronation after the uncontested June 27th presidential elections, Mugabe has attended the AU summit in Egypt with only criticisms from Liberia, Zambia, Botswana, and Senegal; had Mbeki defend him at the UN and the EU by insisting that South Africa and SADC could handle the negotiations of a power sharing agreement. This past weekend, after the unrealistic deadline of 2 weeks had already passed, Mugabe, Tsvangarai and Mutambara attended the SADC summit--although Tsvangarai was harassed in Harare at the airport and his departure delayed--and the summit failed to produce an agreement. Significantly, Botswana and Zambia have presented strong criticism in SADC, and the powerful South African trade union COSATU held protests at the summit against Mugabe's illegitimate claim to rule. So, six weeks post-election, where is the pressure on Mugabe and his ruling clique?